INPACE’s mission is to support the implementation of the Digital Partnerships between the European Union and Japan, South Korea, Singapore, as well as the Trade and Technology Council with India. Partners involved are working in clusters to help break down this large project’s collaborative efforts into manageable sections, providing a dynamic and tangible representation of work progress and project health.
Organised in three pillars, the INPACE Hub will work on policy aspects (Cluster 1 – Digital Dialogues, Policy and Education), rolling out digital technologies (Cluster 2 – Innovation and Entrepreneurship for Sustainable Well-being), and pushing key digital and enabling technologies forward (Clusters 3 – Trustworthy Decision Support, 4 – Chips of the Future and 5 – Future Networks). We have met Dr. Eva Pejsova and Dr. Raluca Csernatoni from Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB), INPACE partners and leaders of Cluster 1.
“Let’s talk about policy: The Overarching Rationale!”
The EU is relatively new into the Indo-Pacific region. The active engagement or digital diplomacy in the Indo Pacific is part of the EU’s broader engagement in the region. Trade, digital cooperation and security are very important associated topics. Cluster 1 aims to serve as a bridge between the technical working groups and other clusters of INPACE, and the policy-making level. The work across all technical topics, focusing on the overarching institutional, legal, regulatory and educational tools needed for the implementation of the EU’s Digital Partnerships into the Indo-Pacific. “Political environments and governments facilitate bonds between countries which will eventually assess relationships between them, and if they are sustainable”, commented Eva Pejsova. Policy dialogues will look more into detail on what has been agreed, what has been done so far, what are the obstacles for enhanced cooperation, what are the challenges and opportunities, what needs to be done at the political level and, of course, at a more academic level if you look into research. Cluster 1 will publish policy papers with a public dissemination. Some policy briefs might be directly sent to policymakers to provide input in technical working groups, added Eva.
“Digital issues are no longer technical matters, but they’re a battleground of technology, values and narratives”. Josep Borrell Fontelles, High Representative Vice-President (2019-2024)
Geopolitics and Geoeconomics in Digital and Technological Cooperation
Engaging with a specific region and taking into account the political strategy and policy nuances within that region is very important: “Our work is to mainstream more strategic policy and political considerations when it comes to all the technological questions, as well as research and innovation priorities that all other clusters of INPACE share”, explained Dr. Raluca Csernatoni. She added an important nuance: “I would also call the INPACE project a forum for discussion where the EU does not only engage bilaterally. INPACE aims to provide a certain amount of leeway for the involvement of Indo-Pacific partners.”
“How are technologies used in geopolitics and geoeconomics, and vice versa? What are the pressure points? Technologies are now used as a power-play and economic security,” pursued Raluca Csernatoni. Engaging with Indo-Pacific partners raises awareness around all these (geo)political and strategic nuances. Countries involved in the INPACE initiative have different approaches towards technological domains and digital cooperation. The work within Cluster 1 is there to understand different governance models too.
Beyond the Brussels Effect: The Change of Paradigm
Until recently, technology and science were seen as apolitical. Now, they are often perceived and used as politicised fields of power, crucial for strategic autonomy and economic security of countries. This geoeconomic paradigm shift is key to understanding the context and significance of Cluster 1 work.
- Geoeconomics
Geoeconomics refers to “economic statecraft,” where countries use economic resources, including science and technology, to achieve geopolitical goals and influence others1. It merges economics with geopolitics, utilising tools like trade policies, investment, and supply chains for strategic national objectives.
Raluca raises the issue of assessing vulnerabilities among partners and suggesting policy measures and collaborations to strengthen digital cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. This requires understanding regulatory, legal, and institutional barriers from a geoeconomic perspective.
Below, we briefly outline what geoeconomics refers to but also how it can affect INPACE, to a certain extent.
- Trade Policies
Trade rivalry and cooperation are managed (i) multilaterally, mainly through the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its treaties and mechanisms, and (ii) regionally/bilaterally, via bilateral investment treaties (BITs), regional trade agreements (RTAs), free trade agreements(FTAs), bilateral digital trade agreements (DTAs), and such like. This is also a way to avoid the term ‘security policy’ and/or replace it by a more neutral ‘trade policy’.
These agreements focus on reducing tariffs and various non-tariff barriers, as well as facilitating trade and improving market access overall.
To give just one example, to reduce those barriers, the EU and Singapore signed a Free Trade Agreement (entered into force in 2019), an Investment Protection Agreement (not yet into force), as well as concluded the talks on a Digital Trade Agreement on 25 July 20242. The goal of the EU-Singapore DTA is to build consumer trust ensure predictability and legal certainty for businesses, and; remove and prevent the emergence of unjustified barriers to digital trade.
The agreement preserves the ability of the EU and Singapore to develop and implement the policies required to address new challenges posed by the digital economy, including to protect privacy and personal data.
On the one hand, these agreements aim to reduce (or already do in the case of the EU-Singapore FTA) the trade barriers mentioned earlier, beyond what is achieved multilaterally at the WTO, of which both the EU and Singapore are members, benefiting businesses and tech stakeholders like corporations and SMEs from both sides. On the other hand, new bilateral agreements give Singapore businesses, especially corporations, greater access to the EU market. However, non-EU businesses must globally comply with the EU’s strict (very often, the world strictest) standards, leading to the adoption of EU standards beyond its borders, including home states of those firms. While the EU does not compel Singapore and its businesses to adhere to its heightened standards, le dicton seems quite clear: ‘follow our standards, or you won’t access our markets’. This is known as the…”California effect3.”
How does this relate to INPACE?
- The Brussels Effect
Coined by Professor Anu Bradford in 2012, the term “The Brussels effet” is named after the similar “California effect” that can be seen within the United States and refers to the EU’s ability to set global standards through its large internal market, without needing explicit consent from non-EU partners4. This occurs as the EU, with its large and influential internal market, establishes stringent regulations in areas such as, AI, data privacy, environmental standards, and consumer protection. Corporations seeking EU market access adopt EU standards globally, influencing laws at home and in other countries. The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), for example, has impacted privacy laws in over 100 countries.
- Beyond the Brussels Effect: INPACE Digital Dialogues, Policy, and Education Work
Unlike other forms of global power, such as military force or economic sanctions, the Brussels effect relies on regulatory authority and the sheer size of the EU market to drive global policy/regulatory convergence.
The INPACE project fosters collaboration beyond the Brussels effect, and accompanies convergence, including policy one, between Europe and Indo Pacific, by facilitating the exchange of knowledge, ideas, pain points, opportunities, standards, best practices across Indo-Pacific partners and between them and the EU.
Cluster 1 supports and channels these multi stakeholder and multi-disciplinary exchanges, because only by bringing in all our stakeholders (tech companies, scientists, policymakers, civil society, etc.) around the table and by facilitating more policy-oriented and strategic conversations among all of them, we can build further cooperation and alignment in the regional and global digital.
- Kim, D. (2021). Making Geoeconomics an IR Research Program. International Studies Perspectives, 22(3),
321–340. https://doi.org/10.1093/isp/ekaa009. See also GSB Staff. (2020, October 15). Geoeconomics
Explains How Countries Flex Their Financial Muscles. Stanford Graduate School of Business.
https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/insights/geoeconomics-explains-how-countries-flex-their-financial-muscles. ↩︎ - European Commission. (2023). EU-Singapore Agreements. European Commission Trade Policy.
https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-
regions/singapore/eu-singapore-agreements_en ↩︎ - Aseeva, A. (2021). From Corporate Social Responsibility to Corporate Social Liability: A Socio-legal Study
of Corporate Liability in Global Value Chains. Oxford: Hart Publishing, p. 19. ↩︎ - Bradford, A. (2012). The Brussels Effect. Northwestern University Law Review, 107(1), 1–67. Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/271. ↩︎